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PACIFIC COAST ETC. BANK

v.

ROBERTS.

[16

C.

(2d)

"own" or "owner ", when not modified by other words in~
dicating either qualified or absolute ownership, depends upon
the subject-matter and the circumstances surrounding the
subject-matter and the parties. (RCA Photophone, Inc., v.
Huffman, supraj Prudential Ins. Co. v. Kraschel, supraj Bare
v. Cole, 220 Iowa 338 [260 N. W. 338].) Thus while in the
State of Iowa it has been held that a mortgagee is an "owner"
under the ordinary tax redemption statute (Lane v. Wright,
121 Iowa, 376 [96 N. W. 902, 100 Am. St. Rep. 362]), it
has also been held that a junior mortgagee, who had foreclosed and obtained a sheriff's deed and reserved a deficiency
judgment prior to foreclosure by a senior mortgagee, was
not entitled to an extension of the period of redemption from
the sale under the senior mortgage, since such junior mortgagee was not an "owner" within the meaning of emergency
legislation relating to the extension of the redemption period
from sale under a mortgage on application of the owner of
the land. (Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Kramer, 218 Iowa,
80 [253 N. W. 809].) The court declared in the case last
cited that" The undoubted objective of the legislation is to
extend grace to the owner or debtor as between him and his
creditor and to protect as far as possible the status quo between the parties and to defer for a brief time the debtor's
ejection from the premises." The effect of the foregoing cases
is, therefore, that a mortgagee may be an owner within the
meaning of redemption statutes generally, but he is not such
an owner as may benefit by emergency legislation enacted
specifically to defer the dispossession of landowners by extending the owners' time for redemption. This must likewise be
the result in the present controversy. That is, while the
plaintiff as ~ortgagee may be entitled to redeem under the
general and unrestricted language of section 47 of the California Irrigation District Act, it may not be recogni~ed as
an owner within the meaning of special emergency legislation which purports to extend exclusively to landowners certain privileges and moratoria in the matter of redemption
of their delinquent lands. An interpretation of the emer.
gency statutes by giving effect to the language actually employed without interpolation is in accordance with the declared legislative objective. The mortgagee, on the other
hand, was not deprived of the right open to it to redeem
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under the general statute, section 47, of the Irrigation District
Act.
The ju.dgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., and Curtis, J., concurred.
Mr. Justice Houser did not participate in the foregoing
decision.

[L. A. No. 16728.

In Bank.-December 26, 1940.]

In the Matter of the Estate of ELLA W. KALT, Deceased.
EARL D. KALT et al., Appellants, v. LEO V. YOUNGWORTH, as Administrator, etc., Respondent.
[1] FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES -

~

CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO ACTIONNECESSITY FOR JUDGMENT OR LIEN.-Under the Uniform Fraudulent
Conveyance Act (Civ. Code, sees. 3439-3440.5) every transfer of
property made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor
of the transferor can be set aside or disregarded by the creditor,
even though he has no judgment or lien.
[2] WILLS-RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES-GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS-TIME OF VESTING OF DEVISES AND BEQUESTS.
Title to property passing by will vests in the legatee at the death
of the testator, subject to the possession and control of the personal
representative during the administration and probate of the estate.
(Prob. Code, sec. 300.)
[3] FRAUDULENT CONVEYANOES-TRANSFERS-IN GENERAL--RENUNCIATION BY LEGATEE.-A renunciation of a legacy by a legatee after the
death of the testator is in effect a transfer of title within the
statute as to fraudulent conveyances (see Civ. Code, sec. 3441 [repealed]; Civ. Code, secs. 3439-3440.5), and may constitute a fraudulent conveyance which is ineffective as against the lien of a creditor. This is true even under the rule that title does not pass until
the legatee accepts, since the power in the legatee, being analogous
to a general power of appointment under a will, caunot be exercised to defeat rights of creditors.

McK. Dig. References: 1. Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers,
§ 79; 2. Wills, § 395; 3,4. Fraudulent Conveyances and Transfers, § 5;
5. Doctrine of Relation; 6,8. Wills, § 394; 1. Deeds, § 59; 9. Decedents' Estates, § 1031,
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[4] ID.-TRANSFERS-IN GENERAIr-EXERCISE OF PowER.-The donee
of a general power of appointment may not exercise it in favor
of a third person, other than a bona fide purchaser for value, when
the claim of a creditor would be defeated; such exercise may be
treated as a fraudulent conveyance, provided insolvency or an intent
to defraud be· present.
[5] DOCTRINE OF RELATION.-The fiction of "relation back" may not be
invoked to destroy the rights of third persons.
[6] WILLS-RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES-Ac·
CEPTANCE - RENUNCIA'rION-DETRIMENTAL BEQUESTs.-The renun·
ciation of detrimental bequests may be sanctioned as a matter of
policy, and it is unnecessary to invoke the doctrine of acceptance
to justify it.
[7] DEEDS-REQUISITES-DELIVERY-AccEPTANcE.-The principle that a
conveyance is effective to vest title even before the grantee has con·
sented to receive it is given recognition in California and other
jurisdictions in the rule that a beneficial gift is presumed to have
been accepted by the donee, even without his knowledge or consent.
(See Civ. Code, sec. 1059, subd. 2.)
[8] WILL8-'RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF DEVISEES AND LEGATEES-AcCEPTANCE - RENUNCIATION - BENEFICIAL BEQUESTS.-A legatee is
free to renounce a beneficial bequest, unless claims of creditors
would be defeated, in which case his wishes are subservient to his
obligations.
[9] DECEDENTS' ESTATES-FINAL DISTRIDUTION-DECREE OF DISTRIBU·
TION-IN GENERAu---DISREGARDING FRAUDULENT RENUNCIATION BY
LEGATEE.-A court decreeing distribution of an estate should give
no effect to a renunciation of a bequest made in fraud of a legatee's
creditors, and it may properly direct that the subject of the bequest
be delivered to the officer who levied an attachment on the interest
of the legatee.

APPEAL from a decree of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, distributing an estate. Elliot Craig, Judge.
Affirmed.
Wolfson & Swetow, Burnett Wolfson, Earl 1. Swetow and
Herbert Schwab for Appellant.
Leo V. Youngworth, in pro. per., and J. Harold Decker for
Respondent.
8. Right of creditors to complain of, or control, debtor's renunciation of benefit under will, or his election to take under or against the
will, note, 27 A. L. R. 47:t

..
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TRAYNOR, J.-In 1932 Ella Kalt died leaving a will in
which she bequeathed the residue of her estate to her two
sons, Earl Kalt and Stanley Kalt, after making certain minor
bequests to their wives and to her grandchildren. Stanley
Kalt was appointed executor by the probate court pursuant to
the terms of the will. Shortly thereafter two actions on
promissory notes were commenced against Stanley Kalt, in
his individual capacity, and his wife Loretta, by Leo Youngworth, administrator of the estate of R. F. Goings. Writs of
attachment were levied upon the interests of Stanley and
Loretta Kalt in the personal property belonging to the estate
of Ella Kalt. Youngworth secured judgments of $1121.38
and $1239.91 against the Kalts and had the abstracts of the
judgments recorded. He secured the issuance of orders for
the examination of the judgment debtors under supplementary proceedings; hearings were held but no satisfaction of
the jUdgments was obtained. Some four years elapsed.
Then in 1936 Stanley Kalt in his individual capacity executed
a written instrument entitled" Renunciation ", as did his wife
Loretta Kalt. Both instruments were filed in the records of
the probate proceedings. By these renunciations Stanley and
Loretta Kalt renounced any interest which they had in the
estate of Ella Kalt as heirs, legatees, or devisees. The findings establish that the Kalts filed the renunciations expressly
to defeat the collection of the judgments; they freely admitted
that they executed the renunciations "because they realized
that any share or interest which they might have in the estate
and which would be distributed to them would be taken by the
attaching creditor, and as long as they were going to lose it,
they preferred to have Earl Kalt receive the share or interest
in the estate which they, or either of them, might otherwise
have. "
In 1937 Stanley Kalt filed his final report as executor of
the estate of Ella Kalt and petitioned for distribution of the
estate. The report and petition, referring to the renuncia_
tions, requested the court to distribute the residue of the estate to Earl Kalt, the remaining residuary legatee. '1'he
judgment creditor objected to the petition for such a final distribution. After a regular hearing the probate Court issued
a decree of distribution which gave no effect to the renunciations filed by Stanley and Loretta Kalt and provided that all
personal property bequeathed to either or both of them under

t
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the terms of the will should be delivered to the officer making
the levy under the writ of attachment secured by Youngworth. From this order Stanley, Loretta and Earl Kalt have
appealed.
There is thus presented to this court a question of first instance in this state: Whether a legatee under a will may defeat
the claims of his creditors by renouncing his legacy. The
courts in four states hold that the right of the donee or
legatee to renounce is absolute even as against his creditors.
(Schoonover v. Osborne, 193 Iowa, 474 [187 N. W. 20, 27
A. t. R. 465]'; Lehr v. Switzer, 213 Iowa, 658 [239 N. W.
564] ; Bradford v. Calhoun, 120 Tenn. 53 [109 S. W. 502, 19
L. R. A. (N. S.) 595] ; People v. Flanagin, 331 TIL 203 [162
N. E. 848, 60 A. L. R. 305] ; Bradford v. Leake, 124 Tenn.
312 [137 S. W. 96, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 1140] ; In re Meiburg,
1 Fed. Supp. 892 at 895; McGarry v. Mathis, 226 Iowa, 37
[282N. W. 786]; Gottstein v. Hedges, 210 Iowa, 272 [228
N. W.' 93, 67 A. L. R. 1218] ; Carter v. Carter, 63 N. J. Eq.
726 [53 Atl. 160] ; see 27 A. L. R. 477; 18 Cal. L. Rev. 298; 37
Mich. L. Rev. 1168; 43 Yale L. J. 1030.) They derive this
rule from the theory that a man cannot be compelled to take
property against his will, and the fiction that the renunciation
"relates back" to the time the gift was made. (Ibid.) It is
far from an absolute rule, however, for the courts have denied
to the donee or legatee the right to renounce as against his
creditors: (1) Where there has been a long delay before
renouncing (Crumpler v. Barfield &; W",'Zson Co., 114 Ga. 570
[40 S. E. 808]; Storm v. Wood, 100 Kan. 556 [164 Pac.
1100] ; In re Howe's Estate, 112 N. J. Eq. 17 [163 Atl. 234]) ;
(2) Where there has been collusion between the debtor and
those benefiting by the disclaimer (Schoonover v. Osborne,
supra; Bradford v. Calhoun, supra); (3) Where the donee
has caused his creditors to rely upon his apparent acceptance
(Daniel v. Frost, 62 Ga. 697; Lehr v. Switzer, supra; Ex parte
Fuller, 2 Story, 327 [Fed. Cas. No. 5,147]. See Kearley v.
Crawford, 112 Fla. 43 [151 So. 293].)
Some courts have subscribed outright to the view that a
legatee may not renounce his bequest to defeat his creditors.
(Estate of Buckius, 4 Pa. Dist. Rep. 775; Daniel v. Frost,
62 Ga. 697; Ex parte Fuller, 2 Story, 327 [Fed. Cas. No.
5,147],)

~
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[1] Under the law of California at the time of the renunciations under consideration, every transfer of property
made with intent to hinder, delay or defraud a creditor of the
transferor was fraudulent and could be set aside or disregarded by such creditor (Civ. Code, sec. 3439) provided he
had a specific lien on the property or had prosecuted his claim
to judgment. (Civ. Code, sec. 3441, now repealed; Moore v.
Schneider, 196 Cal. 380 [238 Pac. 81]; Thomas v. Lavery,
126 Cal. App. 787 [14 Pac. (2d) 160].) Under the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act now in force in this state no
judgment or lien is necessary. (Civ. Code, secs. 3439, 3440.5,
repealing Civ. Code, sec. 3441; Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances [Revised ed.], sec. 76.) The renunciations in this case
were admittedly made to defeat the judgments obtained by respondent. They must therefore be regarded as fraudulent
conveyances if they constituted transfers of property within
the meaning of the act. (See Civ. Code, sec. 3439.01.) It
thus becomes necessary to determine whether or not the
legatees had an interest in the property which could be transferred.
[2, 3] In California, title to property passing by will vests
in the legatee at the date of the death of the testator, subject
to the possession and control of the personal representative
during the administration and probate of the estate. (Prob.
Code, sec. 300; U. S. Fidelity etc. Co. v. Mathews, 207
Cal. 556 [279 Pac. 655].) Therefore, a renunciation by
the legatee after the death of the testator is in effect a tra~s
fer by him of the title he has acquired. By renouncing the
legacy he conveys away the property as effectively as if he
had assigned his interest to the ultimate recipient. In this
state the assignment by a legatee of his legacy under a will
during probate is a fraudulent conveyance ineffective as
against the prior lien of a creditor. (McGee v. Allen, 7 Cal.
(2d) 468 [60 Pac. (2d) 1026]; Hopkins v. White, 20 Cal.
App. 234 [128 Pac. 780].)
Some jurisdictions hold that title to property does not pass
by will to a legatee until he accepts. (Page, Wills (2d ed.),
sec. 1233.) Nevertheless, when a testator dies, the legatee obtains a power, in itself a limited right of ownership (see 51
Harv. L. Rev. 1141 at 1159), to determine the ultimate dispo~ition of the property regardless of acceptance on his part. If
)
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he makes no renunciation, the full title will vest in him when
he acquires possession and control. If he chooses to renounce,
he determines by that action that the title will pass on to some
other heir or legatee. This power is essentially analogous to
a general power of appointment under a will. [4] It is
well established that the donee of a general power of appointment cannot exercise it in favor of some third person, other
than a bona fide purchaser for value, when the claim of his
creditors would thereby be defeated. (A. L. 1. Restatement
of Property, Tentative Draft No.7, sec. 452; Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances [Revised ed.], sec. 158; see, also, cases
collected and commente.d on in 22 Ill. L. Rev. 504.) If he
attempts to do so the creditors may treat the exercise of the
power as a fraudulent conveyance, provided the necessary
factor of insolvency or intent to defraud is present. (Ibid. )
This rule is applied though the debtor is given no interest
in the property other than this general power of appointment
and though the original donor of the power contemplated
that the debtor-donee would probably exercise it in favor of
someone other than himself. (Glenn, Fraudulent Conveyances [Revised ed.], sec. 158.) The debtor is in effect forced
to exercise the power in favor of himself if he exercises it at
all, and to accept the property even against his will. The
principle that the exercise of a general power of appointment
by a debtor may be a fraudulent conveyance as to his creditors clearly supports the rule we adopt in the present case that
a renunciation of a bequest by a legatee may likewise be a
fraudulent conveyance.
[5] A renunciation cannot serve to defeat the claims of
creditors unless it is related back to the date of the testator's
death. The fiction of "relation back" is occasionally employed to protect the rights of third parties. It cannot be invoked to destroy rights it was designed to protect without
gross distortion. In the present situation its application
would deprive the creditor of the renouncing legatees of the
oniy means of satisfying his judgments, merely to yield a
windfall to the ultimate recipierit of the property.
[6] When' bequests are detrimental courts sanction their
renunciation by legatees as a matter of policy since no injury
to creditors is involved. (Healy v. Stevens, 347 Ill. 202 [179
N. E.535]; Elwood.1.'r.ust 00. v. Fritz, 192 Ind. 58 [135 N. E.

Dec. 1940.]
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145] ; Derry Bank v. Webster, 44 N. H. 264; People v. Flanagin, supra; In re Stone's Estate, 132 Iowa 136 [109 N. W.
455, 10 Ann. Cas. ]033] ;.In re Wolfe's Estate, 89 App. Div.
349 [85 N. Y. Supp. 949]-;) In such cases they need hold
only that the legatee can avoid the unwelcome burdens by
making the renunciation. They need not advance the needless elaboration that the renunciation obviates an acceptance
which would effectuate the bequest. The renunciation is itself adequate to relieve the legatee of burdensome property
and there is no necessity to hold that he never acquired the
property because he never accepted it. The doctrine that
acceptance is necessary to effectuate a gift has given ready
expression to the policy of enabling legatees to avoid detrimental bequests. Its convenience in this regard, however,
does not make of it an absolute test for determining when
property vests.
[7] "There is no intrinsic difficulty in regarding a conveyance as effective to vest property in the grantee even before
the latter has consented to receive it." (Tiffany, Real Property, 3d ed., sec. 1055, p. 253; Brown, Personal Property, sec.
50; Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, sec. 150, p. 447.) This
principle is recognized by the majority of the courts, including those in California, when they hold that a beneficial gift is
presumed to be accepted by the donee even without his knowledge or consent. (See Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 1059, subd. 2;
Neely v. Buster, 50 Cal. App. 695 [195 Pac. 736] ; De Levillain v. Evans, 39 Cal. 120; Lehr v. Switzer, supra; Bradford
v. Calhoun, sttpra.) A beneficial conveyance to a person incapable of accepting, such as an infant or one who is non
compos mentis, is "conclusively presumed" to be accepted in
California (Turner v. Turner, 173 Cal. 782 [161 Pac. 980])
and in other jurisdictions. (Staggers v. White, 121 Ark.
328 [181 S. W. 139] ; Egan v. Egan, 301 Ill. 124 [133 N. E.
663] ; Vaughan v. Godman, 94 Ind. 191; Campbell v. Kuhn,
45 Mich. 513 [8 N. W. 523, 40 Am. Rep. 479]; Fenton v.
Fenton, 261 Mo. 202 [168 S. W. 1152] ; Davis v. Garrett, 91
Tenn. 147 [18 S. W. 113].) A conveyance in trust is usually
held to vest the legal title in the trustee even without acceptance or knowledge on his part. (Adams v. Adams, 2] Wall.
185 [22 L. Ed. 504] ; Devol v. Dye, 123 Ind. 321 [24 N. E. 246,
7 L. R. A. 439] ; Minot v. Tilton, 64 N. H. 371 [10 Atl. 682] :
Gulick v. Gulick, 39 N. J. Eq. 401; Myrover v. French, 73
!

..

i

814

ESTATE OF KALT.

N. O. 609; Read v. Robinson (Pa.), 6 Watts & S. 329; Talbot
v. Talbot, 32 R. 1. 72 [78 Atl. 535, Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1221] ;
Furman v. Fisher, (Tenn.) 4 Cold. 626 [94 Am. Dec. 210].)
A deed of trust vests the equitable interest in the beneficiary
without any knowledge or acceptance on his part in California
(Civ. Oode, sec. 2251; Booth v. Oakland Bank of Savings, 122
Cal. 19 [54 Pac. 370] ; Cahlan v. Bank of Lassen County, 11
Cal. App. 533 [105 Pac. 765] ; Sherman v. Hibernia Savings
& Loan Soc., 129 Cal. App. (Supp.) 795, 798 [20 Pac. (2d)
138] ) and elsewhere. (Brooks v. Marbury, 11 Wheat. 78
[6 L. Ed. 423] ; Security Trust &Safe Deposit Co. v. Farrady,
93 Del. Ch. 306 [82 Atl. 24] ; Koch v. Streuter, 232 Ill. 594
[83 N. E. 1072] ; Milholland v. Whalen, 89 Md. 212 [43 Atl.
43, 44 L. R. A. 205] ; Boston v. Turner, 201 Mass. 190 [87
N. E. 634] ; Marquette v. Wilkinson, 119 Mich. 413, 414 [78
N. W. 474, 43 L. R. A. 840] ; Martin v. Funk, 75 N. Y. 134
[31 Am. Rep. 446] ; Skipwith's Exrs. v. Cunningham, 8 Leigh
(Va.), 271, 272 [31 Am. Dec. 642]; A. L. 1. Restatement,
Trusts, sec ..36.)
[8] A legatee is free to renounce even a beneficial bequest,
so long as the rights of third parties are not involved. If,
however, the claims of his creditors would thereby be defeated
he cannot exercise the same freedom. His own wishes then
become subservient to his obligations. A creditor who is
legally entitled to set aside a fraudulent conveyance may exercise the debtor's right to contest a will even though the debtor
himself does not wish to do so. (Brooks v. Paine, 123 Ky. 271
[90 S. W. 600]; In re Langevin's Will, 45 Minn. 429 [47
N. W. 1133] ; Bloor v. Platt, 78 Ohio St. 46 [84 N. E. 605,
14 Ann. Cas. 332].) If the creditor contested the will successfully it would be ironic to leave the debtor free to renounce
the ensuing benefits. A debtor may be compelled not only to
retain his property for the benefit of his creditors, but to dispose of it for the same purpose. There is a like obligation
upon him of which he may acquit himself without hardship,
to avail himself of a bequest. '£he denial to the debtor of
the right to renounce as against his creditors in fact benefits
his own economic interests as well as those of his creditors.
(18 Cal. L. Rev. 298, 302.)
[9] We therefore hold that where, as in this case, a legatee
renounces his bequest in fraud of his creditors, the probate

...
c.~
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court should give the renunciation no effect in issuing the decree of distribution.
.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Gibson, O. J., Ourtis, J., Oarter, J., Edmonds, J., and
Shenk, ~r., concurred.
Mr. J'ustice Houser did not participate in the foregoing
decision.,

[L. A. No. 16494.

In Bank.-December 26, 1940.]

HARRISON R. WARD, Appellant, v. CITY OF MONROVIA (a Municipal Oorporation) et aI., Respondents.
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[1] WAT.E:RS-PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE-EVIDENCE-PRESUMPTIONS AND
BURDEN OF PROOF--ABANDONMEN'l' OR Loss OF WATER RIGHT.-A
plaintiff claiming the right to waters seeping from a water system
on the ground that they had been alilandoned 01' that the defendant's right thereto had been lost by a non-user for a period of
five years, has the burden of proving Hs right.
[2] ID.-Loss AND CONDEMNATION OF WATER RIGHTS-ABANDONMENT-EVIDll:NCE-SEEPAGE FROM WATER SYSTEM.-The evidence was sufficient to show a city's prescriptive right to all the waters in certain eanyons as against a claim of abandonment of seepage from
the system (a) where there was no evidence of seepage continuing
uninterruptedly for a time sufficient to establish a prescriptive title
in one appropriating the escaping waters, and (b) where the evidence showed diligence on the part of the city in making repairs
to its system and the reconstruction thereof when repairs were
no longer economical.
[3] ID.-USER OF WA'i.'ER RIGHTS-EASEMENTS IN REGARD TO USE OF
WATER-TRANSFER AND Loss-Loss-CHANGE OF LOCATION OF PIPE
LINE,--The easement of a city to maintain a pipe line over privately
owned land is not forfeited by changes of location during reconstruction where the deviations were insubstantial, and were wholly
within the limits of ten and twenty foot strips of land which the
eity was entitled to use.
2.

See 26 Cal. Jur. 246; 27 R. C. L. 1281.

McK. DIg. References: 1. Waters, § 718; 2. Waters, § 347; 3. Waters,
§ 253; 4. Easements, § 36; 5. Waters, § 136; 6. Waters, § 126; 7. Waters,
§ 737 (9); 8. Waters, §§ lOS, 739•
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